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Abstract
Contemporary proponents of republican political theory often
focus on the concept of freedom as non-domination, and how best
to promote it within a state. However, there is little attention
paid to what the republican conception of freedom demands in
the international realm. In this essay I examine what is required
for an agent to enjoy freedom as non-domination, and argue that
this might only be achieved for individuals if one of two possibil-
ities is pursued internationally: either (1) all nations are made
equally powerful, such that none may arbitrarily impose its will
on another without penalty, or (2) all nations are joined under a
global sovereign which guarantees that the weaker states are not
subject to the whims of the stronger. I further argue that the
first condition cannot suffice for achieving true non-domination,
and as a result, republicanism must prescribe working toward the
establishment of a global state. This paper provides an important
contribution to the literature by addressing the international
implications of the republican conception of freedom.
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1 Introduction
Republicanism has seen a marked revival in contemporary political the-
ory, especially following the publication of Republicanism: A Theory of
Freedom and Government by Philip Pettit [14]. The core tenet of re-
publicanism is that an agent is only free to the extent that he or she
is not dominated by another. Roughly, to be non-dominated requires
that one not be subject to an arbitrary power of interference in one’s
affairs. However, despite the renewed interest in republicanism, much
of the contemporary literature focuses solely on the concept of freedom,
or its implementation within a state, with little attention paid to the
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international aspect of the theory.1 This is problematic because, as I
will argue, the republican conception of freedom cannot be understood
as an exclusively domestic ideal, but instead requires non-domination at
every level of society, be it individual, state, or international.
In this essay I argue that if we take the republican understanding
of freedom as non-domination seriously, we must arrive at one of two
conclusions for international relations. Either we must pursue a policy
of “reciprocal power”, where we “make the resources of dominator and
dominated more equal so that, ideally, a previously dominated person
can come to defend themselves against any interference”, or we estab-
lish some “constitutional provision” to defend “against arbitrary inter-
ference... by introducing a constitutional authority – say a corporate,
elective agent – to the situation” [14, pp. 67–68].2 What this amounts to
in the context of nations is either a policy whereby we level the power of
each nation, so that none is at the mercy of any other, or we establish a
global state which guarantees the non-domination of all member polities.
I will argue that the first policy is normatively unacceptable, and in fact
theoretically infeasible, and that as a result, we must work toward the
establishment of a global state in order to realize the ideal of freedom as
non-domination. I would like to stress that the aim of the argument to
follow is not to defend republicanism, but rather to explore what follows
from it in the international realm. As such, republican conceptions and
prescriptions will be introduced and explained, but not defended.
The argument will be structured as follows. In section 2 I will briefly
expand on the republican notion of freedom, and how it is to be se-
cured in a society. In section 3 I will extend this notion to the context
of states, arguing that the republican conception of freedom requires
not only domestic but also international non-domination. In section 4
I will present the possible alternatives for achieving international non-
domination, namely the strategies of “reciprocal power” and “constitu-
tional provision”, and argue that the policy of “reciprocal power” is both
normatively and practically problematic. Because of the untenability of
pursuing “reciprocal power”, I will argue in section 5 that we must work
towards a global state, and I will indicate how this global state would
be capable of meeting the requirements for non-domination. In section
6 I will address objections and then briefly conclude.
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2 Freedom as Non-Domination
In order to determine what freedom as non-domination requires in the
international realm, we must first be clear on what it means to say that
an individual agent enjoys freedom as non-domination, and what this
requires within a state. According to Philip Pettit, to be non-dominated
requires that no one “1. have the capacity to interfere 2. on an arbitrary
basis 3. in certain choices that the other is in a position to make”[14,
p. 52]. What this means is that we suffer domination insofar as another
has power of interference in our choices, and that power is not forced to
track our (relevant or avowed) interests. The reason for this is because
domination is characterized by two somewhat conflicting elements. On
the one hand, not just any power of interference will constitute domi-
nation, otherwise by necessity every state would dominate its citizens.
Only power of a certain type, i.e. arbitrary power, will result in domi-
nation. On the other hand, a power of interference which does in fact
track one’s interests will not necessarily be non-dominating. Consider
for example a slave who is well treated by his master. The master’s
power might in all cases track the interests of the slave, but that does
not alter the slave’s status or degree of freedom in the least. He remains
a slave, albeit a slave that is well treated. What makes the master’s
power constitute a dominating power is not contingent on how it is in
fact dispensed, but rather with how it could be dispensed. The master’s
power is dominating because there is nothing which forces it to track
the slave’s interests, and therefore the only restriction on its use is the
master’s will or pleasure. Put differently, the slave is at the mercy of
the master, regardless of how he is in fact treated. This renders the
master’s power arbitrary, and hence the slave unfree, and is at the core
of the republican understanding of freedom. However, the three clauses
specified by Pettit still call for closer inspection.
The requirement that no one have the capacity or power to interfere
sets a very high standard for freedom. It is not enough if we merely
find ourselves not being interfered with, or somehow manage to cleverly
avoid interference, perhaps by ingratiation or subterfuge. It must be
the case that others cannot interfere with us without penalty. This is
because mere non-interference is compatible with the situation of the
well-treated slave discussed above. He may be granted great latitude by
his master, but insofar as he is a slave, he cannot be considered free.
In the same manner, he will not be made more free by tailoring his
actions so as to ingratiate himself with his master. He might be able to
reduce the frequency or intensity of the master’s interference by acting
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in this way, but it will still be the case that his master could at any
time destroy him on a whim, without any penalty for that action. In
order to escape domination and enjoy freedom in the republican sense,
it must be the case that were one to interfere in his choices, there would
be assurance of penalty for that interference. This assurance guarantees
that he need not “kow-tow” or “curry favor” with the more powerful in
order to retain his freedom between certain choices, because he knows
full well that any interference or attempted interference will be met with
severe consequences on the part of the interferer.
Important to the comments above are the notions of “cost” and
“penalty”. For the republican understanding of freedom, these concepts
are necessary for two distinct purposes. First, costs or penalties are used
to substantiate the requirement that (potential) interference track one’s
interests. The threat of penalty is what makes interference not just hap-
pen to track one’s interests, but rather be forced to track one’s interests,
by including a penalty for not doing so. Second, in the event that one
does in fact interfere with you in a manner which does not track your
interests, the execution of the threat ensures that the interferer does not
dominate you. By meting out suitable punishment, your status as a cit-
izen is vindicated, and the wrong done to you is (ideally) undone, or at
least mitigated. Therefore, the costs (or threat of costs) for interfering in
a manner not in line with another’s interests underpins both a deterrent
aspect of the republican ideal, as well as a retributive one. Together,
these ensure that potential interferers do not dominate you, even when
they hold a power to interfere.3
This talk of costs is integrally related to the second criteria of domina-
tion, namely interference (or power of interference), that is perpetrated
on an arbitrary basis. What constitutes an “arbitrary basis” can be
cashed out in a number of different ways, but for the purposes of the
argument to follow, we will employ Pettit’s notion of arbitrariness as in-
terference which is subject just to the judgment of the interferer, or is not
forced to track the interferee’s interests (as judged by the interferee)[14,
p. 55]. This means that interference will be arbitrary in cases where
either there are no structures in place which force interference to track
one’s interests, or there are such structures, but they are ineffectively or
inconsistently administered. Interference will be arbitrary in these two
scenarios for closely related reasons.
In the former, any potential interference will be guided by nothing
other than the will or judgment of the agent interfering, as there ex-
ist no structures which could otherwise guide his actions. This will be
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the case in “states of nature”, where any power differential necessitates
domination, simply in virtue of the fact that the additional power is not
constrained by anything other than the wielder’s pleasure. In fact, dom-
ination will be most widespread in so-called “states of nature”, because
in these scenarios even benevolent agents will dominate those around
them (provided they hold more power) due to the fact that their benev-
olence is subject to nothing other than their wills. It is the mere fact
that nothing and no one forces them to act benevolently which presents
an element of arbitrariness to their, admittedly amiable, dispensations
of power.
In the latter scenario, though there exist structures to constrain the
more powerful, the fact that they are not fully implemented means that
there is de facto domination, despite the de iure provisions against it.
This can be imagined in situations where there is a formal extension of
equal rights to all, but perhaps due to sectarian interests, the rights of
some group(s) are systematically violated. In such cases, the failure to
punish interferers, and consequently the failure to deter future interfer-
ers, will result in the interfering actions being subject to nothing other
than the wills of those doing the interfering. Furthermore, if there is
common knowledge that interference with a certain group will not be
punished, then the decision to interfere (or not) will be based solely
on one’s own judgments, and thus, on Pettit’s account, will be made
arbitrarily.4
The final criterion of domination is that an agent has a power of
arbitrary interference in certain choices that another is in a position
to make. This condition is included to indicate that domination may
be localized to a specific range of choices. For example, the husband
may dominate his wife in the home, or the employer may dominate his
employees in the workplace, without holding any special powers outside
those domains [10, p. 581], [14, p. 58]. Depending on how many choices
another may arbitrarily interfere with, domination suffered may be more
or less broad. In the most extreme case, an agent may be dominated in
all choices, as in the example of the slave.
So for me to enjoy freedom as non-domination, it must be the case
that no other agent, group, institution, or sect has a power to inter-
fere with my choices that is not subject to some form of check. And
for this check to ensure that the interference will indeed track my in-
terests, it must also be the case that I have some relevant say in what
my interests are, and whether they are being adequately secured by the
checks established. This gives us the theoretic basis for establishing the
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institutions necessary for securing freedom as non-domination. These
institutions will have to meet a number of criteria in order to minimize
private dominium, where individuals dominate me, while also avoiding
public imperium, where the state dominates me. To meet these two de-
mands, the institutions will need to strike a careful balance whereby they
hold enough power to prevent private domination whilst simultaneously
ensuring that the institutions’ power remains non-dominating as well.
In order to prevent private domination, it will be necessary to extend
formal and effective equal (basic) rights to all, to guarantee competent
unbiased enforcement of those rights, and to guarantee at least a min-
imal level of well-being, such that none may be exploited. These con-
ditions will ensure that no one individual possesses more formal power
than others, either in terms of legislative authority or judicial entitle-
ments, because all citizens will be extended the same basic rights. The
requirement that all be provided with at least minimal well-being will
prevent any (formally equal) citizens from being dominated due to a lack
of options, as in the case of an employer who dominates his employees
in virtue of being their only source of potential income. In addition
to these requirements, the institutions will also need to incorporate a
robust contestatory democratic element to ensure that they themselves
do not become imperious, and to provide the citizenry with the means
to voice their interests. By making the institutions and their decisions
democratically contestable, and by providing a forum for citizens to voice
their interests, those interfered with will have a guarantee that the in-
terference is not perpetrated with a malign will or on an arbitrary basis.
To fully establish and entrench the ideal of freedom as non-domination,
much more than this will likely be required, but these criteria will form
the core of a republican system. As such, each criterion demands a more
thorough treatment.
The formal and effective extension of equal rights to all will be the
first step to realizing non-domination, because it places all citizens on an
equal footing, both legislatively and judicially. This means that no one
need fear the power of another, because it will not be possible to simply
impose one’s will without consequence. The extension of equal rights
should assure this even when others possess much more wealth or power,
because the system will ideally be organized such that citizenship gives
the same formal and political benefits to all. This means that all citizens
will ideally have the same ability to influence legislation and enjoy the
same judiciary protections. Even in cases where some individuals do
possess more power, the equal extension of rights will guarantee that the
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extra power cannot be used to interfere in the realm of choices protected
by those rights. Thus, at the very least, an equal extension of rights
will increase the range of non-domination, even if it does not suffice for
securing it completely.
Competent and guaranteed enforcement of rights will be important
for substantiating and maintaining the citizens’ faith in those rights they
do possess. Thus, if some group is arbitrarily interfered with, and the
perpetrators are not brought to trial, or are able to avoid conviction
by subterfuge or bribery, the wronged parties will not merely have suf-
fered that interference, but will be subject to a further continuing state
of domination. This is because they will be placed in a state of fear,
believing they may be interfered with at any future time without hope
of protection. Such a belief will lead to ingratiation or slavish behavior
toward their persecutors, a state indicative of domination. Furthermore,
by failing to punish the perpetrators, the deterrent aspect of the rights
will be lost, leading the interferers (and perhaps others) to make deci-
sions in the future based solely on their own judgments, without regard
for the interests of the interferees.
Once we have established effective equal rights for all, and developed
a suitable enforcement mechanism, it will still be vital to establish a
minimal level of well-being to shore up any informal but effective domi-
nation that might persist. For example, if some segments of society are
extremely poor, they may be held hostage by employers or politicians
who need not actually interfere, but could force the hand of citizens by
threatening to withhold certain necessities. By ensuring some minimal
level of well-being, the worse off individuals in society will be in a posi-
tion to strike fair bargains and avoid exploitation. Thus, it will not be
enough if contracts or agreements are struck consensually. They must
also be struck in an environment where the worse off parties have suitable
alternatives to the contract at hand. This means that when negotiating,
it must be the case that the worse off parties do not suffer any form of
duress, be it active coercion on the part of the opposing party, or implicit
threat of starvation or privation in the case of refusal. If this condition is
not met, then individuals will remain dominated, because they will live
at the mercy or will of those who can force them into disadvantageous,
even slavish, contracts.
Finally, in order to prevent the institutions themselves from becom-
ing dominating, and to make them responsive to the interests of the
citizenry, it will be necessary to implement some form of contestatory
democracy. What is meant by this is that the institutions and organs
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of the state must at least be subject to review by the citizens. It is
not necessary that citizens have a direct hand in the governance of the
state, or that they even necessarily be able to participate in any voting-
based democratic fashion. What is necessary is that each and every
citizen have a protected right to contest the decisions of the state in an
open and communicative forum. This ensures that when citizens have
complaints, they may voice them in a setting where they know those
complaints will be heard and given due consideration. Thus, “the con-
trol achieved under the democratic institutions envisaged will be enough
to guard against government domination if it enables people to think
that when public structures and policies and decisions frustrate their
personal preferences, that is just tough luck”, but is not an indication
of a malign will [11, p. 143]. To be sure, these considerations will not
necessarily get us all the way to the ideal of freedom as non-domination,
but they represent the core elements required.
3 Freedom: A Global Ideal
With the basic requirements for non-domination roughly sketched and
the minimal necessary institutions presented, we are now in a position
to explore what, if anything, the republican standard calls for interna-
tionally. This can be most easily evaluated by simply taking the do-
mestic inter-personal standards for non-domination and applying them
to inter-state relations. Therefore, just as the republican ideal gives us
a blueprint for when agents dominate one another, by extrapolation we
can see when groups of agents, i.e. nations, dominate one another. The
republican ideal can be extrapolated in this simple fashion because the
criteria for non-domination will be the same, and will be satisfied in the
same manner; just as citizens within a state will suffer domination inso-
far as others have a power of arbitrary interference, the citizens of a state
will suffer external domination by other nations if those nations possess
an arbitrary power to interfere in the choices of the former. To make
this point clear, consider an example. Say a small republican nation is
situated such that a much larger nation is adjacent to it, and this larger
nation has significantly more economic, military, and international polit-
ical power. This more powerful nation will dominate the smaller to the
extent that the stronger has a power to interfere which is not in some
fashion forced to track the interests of the weaker. And just as in the
case of the benevolent master, it will not suffice if the stronger nation is
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simply disposed to not interfere, because this disposition will be at the
whim of the stronger, and hence arbitrary. It must rather be the case
that the stronger party cannot interfere without some penalty attending
that interference. Barring this assurance, the smaller nation will live at
the mercy of the stronger.
To provide such an assurance, and thus to remove the domination
hanging over the small republic, it will be necessary to establish the min-
imal institutions required for achieving interpersonal non-domination, or
to render them unnecessary. This will amount to either making it such
that no nation in fact could interfere, thus eliminating the need to es-
tablish the institutions, or by making it such that interference, were it
to occur, would be forced to track the interests of the interferee (i.e. the
state). Therefore, republicanism will require either “leveling the field”,
as it were, or creating an empowered supranational organization to re-
move any potential arbitrariness from the decisions of states.
This should indicate the rough shape of what republicanism demands
on the international scale. Since nations have greatly varied power, in
terms of economic abilities, military might, and political clout, in order
for the people of these nations to remain non-dominated, there must
exist some check on the power of the stronger, guaranteeing that the
weaker will not be subject to their vagaries. Such a check will be pro-
vided by extending and enforcing equal sovereign liberties to all states.
Furthermore, as in the discussion of the domestic requirements, it must
be the case that the poorer nations are not so destitute as to make them
targets of exploitative contracts. This will require that those worse off
nations are guaranteed at least some minimal standard of welfare, such
that they can stand as equals in the community of nations. Finally, in
order to ensure that any actual interference is not also arbitrary, it will
be necessary that the nations of the world have some contestatory say in
any decisions which will affect them. These conditions represent nothing
more than the minimal requirements for a republican society, broadened
to the international scale.
If it is our wish to effectively implement republicanism within a so-
ciety, it will be necessary that the domestic conditions be broadened in
this manner in order to meet global republican demands. If this were
not the case, then a state with maximal internal non-domination would
be deemed maximally free even in the event that that country was dom-
inated by its neighbor. This conclusion is untenable in the republican
framework. For a people to be free, they must govern themselves, or at
least be able to effectively contest the laws, for, in the words of Richard
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Price, “a country that is subject to the legislature of another country
in which it has no voice, and over which it has no controul, cannot be
said to be governed by its own will” [17, p.30]. If a country, or the
people of a country, are not governed by their own will, then they are
by necessity governed by the will and judgment of another [14], an alien
control [13]. This represents the archetype of arbitrary power, and com-
promises any level of internal non-domination achieved. Therefore, in
order to achieve freedom as non-domination, it cannot be enough to
merely preserve it domestically, but must also include an international
set of constraints guaranteeing that those countries which have achieved
internal non-domination do not suffer external domination. Only in this
way can true non-domination be realized.
4 Freedom Through Reciprocal Power
As indicated above, external non-domination could be achieved in one
of two ways, by either “leveling the field”, as it were, ensuring that
all nations have the same (or a roughly comparable) level of power,
such that none could effectively dominate the other, or by imposing
some empowered global order which would prevent domination between
states in the same manner that the state prevents domination between
individuals. Following Pettit, we will call the former strategy “reciprocal
power”, and the latter “constitutional provision” [14, pp. 67–68].
In some respects, the strategy of reciprocal power seems more readily
achievable, in that it does not appear to necessarily call for any signifi-
cant reordering of the current set of states. Strictly speaking, all that it
requires is that individuals “can defend themselves effectively against any
interference that another can wield” [14, p. 67], but this seems feasible
without necessarily fragmenting larger states or redrawing boundaries.
Admittedly, the simplest (theoretical) method of ensuring that each state
could defend itself would be to make each state as equal as possible, in
terms of size, population, military strength, and economic productivity,
but it is not clear that such a program could be carried out in a manner
which does not dominate the people whose nations are being forcibly
partitioned. However, it is theoretically possible to provide each state
with adequate military means of self-defense without employing such a
radical procedure. This could even be done in such a way that states
are given the military power to defend themselves, yet are incapable of
using that power for belligerent purposes, getting us very close to the
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ideal of non-domination. The idea would be to construct an impass-
able network of defenses which are totally fixed, such that each state
would be enabled to protect itself, but could not use that protection
for any offensive ends. [4] argues for just such a method, claiming that
“a government strengthened with forts in passes, and other convenient
places, might be very capable to defend itself, and yet altogether unfit
for conquest”, because their military defenses would be immobile [4, p.
207]. Thus, it is appears to be at least theoretically possible to prevent
military domination in this fashion, without adding any probability for
armed conflict, because the methods of defense could be designed so as
to be unusable for offense.
However, this line of thought, albeit seemingly theoretically possi-
ble, is practically problematic for a number of reasons. First of all, the
types of equipment typical of modern militaries are not things that can
be easily made “unfit for conquest”. Even if we were to build forts or
strong points of defense, ensuring that countries could not be conquered,
there would likely still be tanks, aircraft, and naval vessels, not to men-
tion rifles, grenades, and hand-held weapons. By relying more on fixed
defenses, it might be possible to restrict the number of mobile weapons,
but it is not clear that these could be wholly removed, leaving the pos-
sibility for countries to wage aggressive wars. This might even be made
more likely if all countries’ defenses are bolstered by fixed weapons, be-
cause the mobile weapons could then be deployed abroad without fear of
vulnerability at home. Furthermore, even if we suppose that the phys-
ical arm of the military could be designed and executed in the fashion
imagined by Fletcher, an important aspect of modern defense hinges on
cyber-security, both for the state and individual. A country must not
only be secured against invasion, but must also be secured against cyber-
warfare. However, much of the research and technology which goes into
cyber-defense can be just as easily used for offensive purposes.5 Given
this, it is hard to see how we could ensure that countries could defend
themselves without also simultaneously increasing the risk of small-scale
armed conflict. This is problematic because armed conflict, even when
extremely small-scale, results in extensive and deeply penetrating domi-
nation. Whether it is localized to one village on the frontier of a nation
or to the capital city, when soldiers carrying rifles fire at each other
in the streets, there is no longer anything protecting one’s interests or
forcing potential acts of interference to track them. In most cases, the
acts of soldiers in war are nothing if not arbitrary with respect to the
local populations, and if by establishing defensive networks we increase
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nations’ propensity for war, then the republican ideal cannot condone
this. Therefore, it is not, as initially thought, possible to “level the field”
militarily without simultaneously introducing another potentially graver
source of domination, i.e. war.
In addition to this, the strategy of reciprocal power initially outlined
– supposing the above objections could be surmounted – could only
ever get us stable non-domination of a military sort. However, in order
to truly be free, it must be the case that nations escape all forms of
domination, be they military, economic, political, or otherwise. Given
this, the strategy of reciprocal power begins to look very implausible. For
supposing we somehow could make all nations incapable of being invaded
or conquered, they could still be beggared or bullied by those with the
economic might to pressure their decisions. Moreover, short of a radical
reordering of states, it is not clear that there exists any method for
establishing the self-defensive measures required for reciprocal power to
be effective. If small nations lack the economic clout to command equal
footing in negotiations, there will be nothing to prevent the stronger from
exploiting them by threatening to withhold contracts or investments, or
threatening to embargo trade. These considerations will conspire to
make the leaders of small nations act deferentially toward the stronger,
currying favor and ingratiating where possible. Such actions are not
indicative of a free and undominated individual (or state).
The problem is further compounded if we recognize the global nature
of current economics. Even if a nation is fully self-sufficient, such that a
total trade embargo could easily be tolerated, other nations will still be
able to interfere in subtle but considerable ways. For example, a nation
which is home to large international corporations could, by threatening
to move factories elsewhere, leverage the weaker in ways which are not
“forced to track their interests”. This type of action will often lead to
“bidding wars” between small nations, where each party undercuts the
other, leaving benefit only to the stronger, and since the stronger is in a
position to hold out longest, it can always force the hands of the weaker
in this manner. This policy of playing the weaker parties off each other
is common practice for many large corporations, and represents a signif-
icant form of domination for the people being exploited, as their choices
are restricted without them having any ability to effectively object.6
Furthermore, their inability to object is not due to some malign will or
interfering agency, but is simply because without some supra-national
agency, they have no one to object to. In a world where the state is the
highest power, there is no guarantee against domination for the weak or
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poor.
The underlying problem with the strategy of reciprocal power is that
it is predicated on the assumption that the power of agents (individual
or corporate) can be equalized, at least to a high enough degree that
no one may dominate the other. However, this simply cannot be done
unless we forcibly divide the larger and more powerful nations so that
none holds (substantially) more power than another. Furthermore, if
there exist some states with virtually no resources or military assets, it
might never be possible to achieve such a total equalization through mere
division of states. Finally, even were we to (counterfactually) assume
that the resources and power of the world could be so easily divided,
a division of this kind would be extremely dominating for the people
of states which do not wish to be divided. For example, if a people
identifies very strongly with their nationality, such that to take that
away could never track their interests, then by eliminating their nation
(through division among smaller polities) we impose a significant force of
domination on this particular group for no other reason than that they
have the ‘misfortune’ of living in a prosperous land they are proud to
call home. We might try to mitigate this domination by giving them an
effective say in the division process, perhaps along the lines of democratic
contestation, but this will go beyond the strategy of reciprocal power.
To achieve non-domination internationally, the strategy of recip-
rocal power simply will not be enough, and moreover, could not be
enough, because it is self-defeating. The actions required for securing
non-domination in this manner would introduce just as much or more
domination along the way, by forcing entire peoples to submit to inter-
ference which would be, from their vantage, arbitrary. Instead, we will
need to pursue a policy more in keeping with the prescriptions for se-
curing non-domination domestically. Just as individuals are protected
from domination by assurance that they will enjoy equal rights, a say
in contestatory democratic processes, and a minimal level of welfare,
the state can be protected by the same measures. If we grant all states
equal rights (in terms of their sovereign liberties), an equal ability to
contest the decisions of others in an effective manner, and a minimal
level of economic well-being, such that they cannot be forced into ex-
ploitative contracts, then states will be able to enjoy (at least minimal)
non-domination in the international realm.
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5 Freedom Through a Global State
If, as argued, the strategy of reciprocal power cannot establish inter-state
non-domination, then we must look to other alternatives for securing
freedom. The most obvious candidate for this would be the global state.
Reciprocal power fails in the international realm because it could only be
pursued using dominating means, and because it lacks the institutional
framework necessary for guaranteeing rights and mitigating the effects of
large economic inequalities. The global state, on the other hand, would
be ideally positioned to handle these sorts of problems and would not
(necessarily) itself constitute a force of domination, and thus presents
a prima facie suitable alternative. In this section, I will argue that the
global state is fully capable of meeting all of the criteria set for achieving
international non-domination, and can do so without becoming a force of
imperium itself. However, before arguing for the global state, a potential
alternative must first be explored.
This alternative is the proposal for a league of nations, famously
advanced by Kant. According to Kant, no nation (or its people) can
enjoy freedom if they fear the vicissitudes of their neighbors, just as
no individual can enjoy freedom in the lawless “state of nature” [6, p.
81]. Because of this, it is necessary that states join some form of union
to secure the peace, thus allowing freedom to flourish. However, for
this union to present an alternative, it must fall short of a global state
in terms of coercive powers and institutional apparatus. As a result, we
must strike for a middle-ground, and seek to establish a league of nations
which is capable of preserving global peace while furthering the cause
of individual freedom, but which also avoids amalgamating all peoples
of the earth under a single homogeneous institution. This envisaged
order would be structured so as to encourage states to deliberate and
negotiate as equals, rather than resorting to violence and coercion to
further their agendas. Importantly, the league would also be designed in
such a way that states could enter or leave it freely, and states would not
be permitted to use coercive power against others, making it essentially
a consensual endeavor based on voluntary agreement. The requirement
of free entry (and exit) and the restriction against coercion are vital for
distinguishing the league of nations from the global state. Without these
conditions in place, the league would be more akin to a global federalized
state than a league of independent states.
This proposal is, on republican grounds, much stronger than the
strategy of reciprocal power, in that it provides for a loose institution
capable of solving at least some of the global problems indicated above.
Nathan Wood: Republican International Relations 65
However, what it achieves will still fall short of the republican ideal
for one important reason. To argue for this, let us first suppose that
there exists such a league, and furthermore that all nations belong to
it and are in good standing. By being “in good standing”, I mean that
all members agree with the republican principles of freedom laid down,
and live up to them. Further suppose that the republican principles
advocated are in accordance with the most demanding understanding of
republican freedom. What we then have is a situation where all nations
of the earth freely choose to follow republican norms, and seek to secure
maximal non-domination globally.
However, crucial to the idea of a league of nations is that members
may opt out as they please, and that members may not coerce others
in any fashion. If they could not leave at will, or if others could le-
gitimately interfere with their choices, they would no longer constitute
a league of separate nations, but would rather be members of a global
confederate state. This means that despite all members commitment
to securing freedom, none of them will actually be compelled to secure
freedom. More importantly, there will be nothing and no one that could
legitimately force their actions to follow the interests of other confeder-
ates, as the terms of the agreement do not allow for coercion between
member states. Therefore, there will exist no guarantee that other states
will not interfere in their choices arbitrarily, because the only legitimate
constraints on any state’s actions will be its own domestic politics. In
this imagined situation, it will indeed be the case that nations, and the
people of those nations, enjoy great (perhaps maximal) latitude in their
choices, but they will still not be free in republican terms. This is because
republican freedom demands that any potential interference be forced to
track the interests of the interferee, regardless of whether or not others
do in fact interfere. But without a legitimate means of coercion between
members, there can be no guarantee that interference will be forced to
track the interests of the interferee. Though the imagined league fares
better than a state of abject and arbitrary interference, this situation is
not qualitatively different than when a slave is granted great latitude by
his master.7 Wherever there exist power differentials and no authority
guaranteeing that potential interference will track the interferee’s inter-
ests, there exists domination. The league of nations will get us closer
to global (and hence individual) non-domination, by increasing the po-
tential costs of interference (perhaps through loss of prestige or esteem
within the league), but it alone cannot secure it completely. In order
to achieve this, it will be necessary that there be some higher agency to
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which all members belong, and which meets the criteria laid down for
the establishment of domestic freedom.
If, as argued, both reciprocal power and a league of nations are insuf-
ficient for securing freedom, then the only possible alternative remaining
is a global state. As argued in section 2, minimal non-domination re-
quires at the very least the formal and effective extension of equal rights
to all, competent and guaranteed enforcement of those rights, a mini-
mal level of equality between citizens, and some degree of contestatory
democracy. For states to be free, and hence for the citizens of those
states to be free, these minimal requirements must also be realized at
the international level. This means that each nation must enjoy an effec-
tive extension of the same sovereign liberties that all other states possess,
each must be provided with a guarantee that those liberties will be en-
forced, each must be secured from gross poverty, and each must be able
to effectively contest the decisions made by others, in order that their
relevant interests be observed. In the remainder of this section I will
argue that these conditions can be satisfied by a global state.
The first criterion for non-domination to be achieved internationally
is that all nations enjoy the same effective sovereign liberties. This is
necessary because if some states possess more rights than others, then
they will also possess more power than others, and absent some supra-
national agency, they will hold that additional power arbitrarily. Such a
state of affairs is inimical to freedom. One might object that a state could
hold more rights, but only ones which concern the domestic functions of
that state. For example, the treaty of Westphalia gave each prince the
right to dictate the religion of his kingdom, but demanded that he not
interfere with other kingdoms. This effectively extended the rights of
rulers, but did so in a manner which did not impact the rights of other
countries.
However, a right of this kind is in and of itself a violation of re-
publican liberty, as it constitutes an arbitrary power of interference the
prince holds over his people. If we are trying to secure freedom as non-
domination, both internally and externally, then a state’s sovereign liber-
ties must first and foremost be compatible with internal non-domination.
Taking this constraint for granted, the only liberties left that a state
possesses which are then relevant for non-domination are those liberties
which involve interactions with other states, because these represent the
last scenario where agents or agencies may have a power of arbitrary
interference in others’ choices. If the only relevant sovereign liberties are
liberties in interaction between states, then it is clear that an unequal
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distribution of these will constitute domination. This is because some
countries will then have more freedom in negotiation or diplomacy than
others, granting them a power to interfere, and barring some empowered
supra-national agency (like a global state), this additional power will be
held arbitrarily. Thus, it will be necessary that all nations have equal
sovereign liberties or rights.
Providing this assurance of equal rights will be the first task of a
global state. However, it is a task that a global state is well-equipped
to handle. Just as in the establishment of equal rights in domestic so-
ciety, the global state can realize this agenda by simply including some
form of constitutional provision extending the same rights to all. This
would grant all nations the same formal rights, and would constitute an
important first step toward establishing international non-domination.
However, for those rights to be at all effective, both the formal right
“and sovereignty (dominium) have to be exercised” [9, p. 82]. By
“sovereignty”, we mean supreme authority in a range of affairs.8 This
understanding maintains that there exists a sovereign power insofar as an
agent (or agency) is the ultimate decider and executor in a given range
of decisions. This agent could be an individual or a corporate body. For
example, the state holds sovereign power over military decisions, and
the individual holds sovereign power over personal choices like religion
or profession. If sovereignty, so understood, is not present alongside the
rights being invoked, those rights lose their legal and protective value,
because they then lack an enforcer. In such a scenario, the rights will
not suffice to ensure non-domination.
For sovereignty to underpin a right held by a state, it must either
be the case that that state has the power to protect its own rights,
making the state its own enforcer, or that its rights are protected by a
greater sovereign of which the state is a member, making that higher
authority the enforcer. The former notion has already been considered
and rejected in our treatment of “reciprocal power”. The latter simply
amounts to saying that a nation’s rights are effective rights when they
are secured by a global sovereign, who exercises the power to protect all
rights of individuals, be they states, territories, peoples, or single agents.
Thus, to hold equal sovereign liberties requires both that all nations have
the same formal rights, and that those rights are equally protected by a
common sovereign, i.e. a global state. The global state would be able
to guarantee the enforcement of each state’s rights as long as it held
some form of coercive powers which could be exercised against would-be
infringers. Therefore, provided the global state has at its disposal some
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form of global policing agency, it will be able to provide the “competent
and guaranteed” enforcement of rights required to establish international
non-domination.
The condition that all nations be secured from gross poverty more
straightforwardly points to a global state. Pettit says that each state
“ought to enjoy the capacity to frame its expectations and proposals on
the assumption of having a status no lower and no higher than others
and so to negotiate in a straight-talking, open manner” [11, p. 128].
However, if some nations are so destitute as to rely on foreign assistance
for their very survival, then they will be at the mercy and goodwill of
others, and will be forced to ingratiate themselves with those who might
offer assistance. This will prevent them from any kind of “straight-
talking, open” negotiation, and will instead relegate them to a lower
status. In fact, even a nation who is highly disposed toward charity
will present a problem on this front, because unilateral assistance is
antithetical to the republican ideal, insofar as it places the poorer nation
under the power its benefactor in the same way a slave is dependent on
his master. By providing unilateral aid, even well-intentioned unilateral
aid, a benefactor reduces the status of a beneficiary to that of a client or
dependent, undermining the likelihood of future treatment as an equal.
This means that it cannot be enough for individual nations to reduce
poverty, but instead requires that aid be provided multilaterally, such
that no nation is made dependent on a single other.
One might object here that multilateral aid can be provided without
a global state, so republicanism need not call for such a drastic mea-
sure. However, the republican ideal demands not just that one have the
good fortune to be lifted from extreme poverty, but that one be guar-
anteed of this assistance. If this guarantee were not in place, then there
would still be good reason for the impoverished to act in a servile or
subservient manner toward those who might provide assistance. Only in
knowing with certainty that assistance will come are those worse off par-
ties allowed to “hold their heads high” and demand treatment as equals.
Multilateral aid will certainly allow for less arbitrariness and more cer-
tainty of assistance than mere unilateral aid, but it is still possible for
all donors in the aid scheme to simply opt out. We cannot secure non-
domination by trading the arbitrary power of one for an arbitrary power
of many. It must rather be the case that aid is guaranteed by a larger
body in which the recipient has a say, so as to ensure that the actions of
this larger body are “forced to track the interests” of the recipient. This
will allow those impoverished nations to meet the stronger on an equal
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footing in negotiation, knowing that their actions and opinions will not
be cause for penalization.
A global state will be able to offer such a guarantee by simply ex-
tending a right to all nations stipulating that they will not be allowed
to suffer extreme privations. Similar to the case of domestic society, the
global state could enforce this right by extracting some proportionate
level of taxes from member states and using the funds to guarantee that
the worst off would not be so destitute as to be exploitable. Importantly,
the global state would not necessarily have to eliminate global poverty
or impose cosmopolitan demands on member states. All it must ensure
is that the poorer or worse off are not dominated, but this might be
achieved without necessarily eliminating global poverty.
This brings us to the final condition necessary for minimal non-
domination to be achieved for a nation and its people. If, as argued,
the rights of nations, the enforcement of those rights, and an assurance
of assistance can only be secured by some global sovereign, then it will
be vital that this sovereign is not itself dominating. This mirrors the
domestic case, where we must establish sufficient institutions for elimi-
nating private domination, without also making those institutions into a
force of public domination. The simplest way to achieve this, like in the
domestic case, would be to make the decisions and structures of the in-
stitutions democratically contestable by member states (or their people).
By allowing states to voice grievances in an open forum which is respon-
sive to their positions, we can ensure that the actions of the global state
will in fact track the interests of members. Making the decisions of the
global state contestable in this manner will also be relatively undemand-
ing, in that it requires nothing more than that the decisions be made in
an environment of (relative) transparency, and that the media and cit-
izens are free enough to openly demonstrate against those decisions. If
non-domination has been secured domestically, these requirements will
likely already be fulfilled.
Since we have so far been discussing the minimal requirements for se-
curing non-domination, we need only seek to establish a minimal global
sovereign, whose sole functions would be to extend and protect all states’
(non-dominating) sovereign liberties [11, p. 168], and guarantee assis-
tance in the event of extreme poverty [11, p. 176]. Additionally, to
ensure that the global sovereign’s power does not become arbitrary, it
must be the case that its decisions are democratically contestable by
member states [11, p. 169]. Given these considerations, it will not be
the case that the sovereign need have any say in the day-to-day affairs
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of the individual constituent nations. In fact, for non-domination to be
most deeply secured, it ought rather to be the case that the sovereign
actively avoids as much interference as possible. Just as in the case of
domestic non-domination, a state whose presence is felt in too many of
one’s decisions will begin to present a force of imperium, compromising
the freedom of agents. In the same manner, a global sovereign should
work to ensure that all individual states escape domination from others,
but should also strive to be as unobtrusive as possible. This will allow
for the broadest and deepest enjoyment of non-domination on the part
of states and people.
If we are working with a global state that is minimal in this re-
spect, then it will also not be necessary that the state have any ex-
tensive democratic institutional apparatus. All that will be required is
that the decisions made by the state be contestable in variety of ways,
most importantly through judicial appeals, popular interrogations and
protests, and through the media and watchdog officials [11, p. 169].
Therefore, even though the decisions need not be ex ante democratically
approved, they must be democratically acceptable. What it means for
decisions to be democratically acceptable is that it be possible to effec-
tively protest or alter the decisions through an open forum of discussion
between equals. This form of effective contestability can be achieved in
the international realm, i.e. between members of the global state, by
providing member states with legal and popular means of contestation
which parallel those found in domestic society [11, p. 169]. Such an ar-
rangement might conceivably be achieved by extending institutions like
the European Parliament, and delegating more power to them, espe-
cially in terms of abilities of enforcement. Furthermore, if we take the
European Parliament or the UN as examples of minimal global institu-
tions with properly enfranchised members, we can begin to see what a
global state might look like. Granted, a true global state would have
to possess far more power to enforce the rights of member states than
either the UN or European Parliament currently possess, but the under-
lying structure of these institutions provides a plausible blueprint for the
institution required.
6 Objections
Up to this point it has been argued that in order for any agent to enjoy
freedom as non-domination, it must be the case that that agent be free
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from domination from other agents, his state, other states, and inter-
national bodies. That is, an agent can only be free if there is no other
agent (individual or corporate) who has a power of arbitrary interference
in his choices. This, it has been argued, can only be securely achieved if
the agent in question lives in a free society which has its sovereign liber-
ties and minimal well-being guaranteed by some larger global institution
whose decisions are democratically contestable. However, it would be
remiss not to consider some likely objections to the argument at hand.
This section will explore the most pressing objections and present re-
sponses to each, followed by a brief conclusion.9
The majority of objections will relate to three main concerns: a fear
that the argument leads to cosmopolitanism, a concern about whether
the envisaged state is at all feasible, and a worry about how the global
state should (or could) be organized in a non-dominating but effective
manner.
Pettit is sensitive – and sympathetic – to all three objections, but is
most resistant to the idea of a global state based on theoretical concerns
with cosmopolitanism. He argues that freedom necessitates a world of
many states, because the state holds special responsibilities to its own
citizens which it does not owe to those of other states.10 Cosmopoli-
tanism, on the other hand, maintains that there are no such “special”
obligations, and the duties we owe are duties owed equally to all.11 How-
ever, supposing for the sake of argument that Pettit’s denial of cos-
mopolitanism is correct, does this entail a denial of the global state? I
argue no.
The global state argued for is an extremely minimal state, which only
exists to protect and enforce the sovereign liberties of member states and
guarantee them a minimal level of well-being. It does not say that all
states owe the same duties to the citizens of other states, and there is
no reason why it would prescribe or enforce such a notion. In fact, as a
state designed to minimize domination, it would do better to leave the
details of governance and inter-state diplomacy to the member states,
so long as they themselves promote freedom as non-domination within
their respective domains. This is because the global state is established
expressly for the purpose of minimizing domination between states, and
this will not likely be achieved by forcing the wealthier or more powerful
to give up their resources for the worse off. What it will say is that the
wealthier and more powerful must be made incapable of arbitrarily in-
terfering with the weaker, but this by no means entails cosmopolitanism.
Therefore, the objection to cosmopolitanism is not an objection to the
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global state at all, because it rests on a misunderstanding of what is im-
plied by a global state. The global state exists to enforce member states’
sovereign liberties and guarantee assistance in times of need, but it does
not demand that states treat all people as their own citizens, because
such a demand would be dominating to those peoples without the wish
to assist their neighbors. If an individual republican state can permit
agents to be selfish and uncaring toward their neighbors, so long as they
do not dominate them, then a republican global state can just as easily
allow one corporate agent (i.e. member state) to be selfish and uncaring
toward its neighbors (i.e. other member states), so long as it does not
dominate them.12
The second objection concerns the feasibility of such a state. One
might argue that even if we grant the theoretical reasons in favor of a
global state, it would never be possible to create such an entity, and to
think that the powerful would give up the extra privileges they enjoy
in negotiations and diplomacy is utopian. The objection is not so much
that creating the global state will be impracticable, but rather that it
will be impossible. To this concern, not much may be said that is not
speculative or open to further objection. However, we can sketch one
possibility for establishing the core of such an institution, and build from
there. If this possibility is at all plausible, then it is at least possible to
create such an entity, even if it might be improbable.
Arguably, the most difficult task in establishing anything like a global
state will be getting the first group of core nations on board. As one of
the primary aims of the minimal global state is to protect and enforce
members’ sovereign liberties, it will be necessary that military power
be controlled by this global, at least minimally democratic, authority.
Since the member states would be asked to delegate command of their
armed forces to an international body, it would make most sense to begin
with a core of nations that is apt to place trust in one another. A likely
candidate would be something like the countries included in NATO, who
already are bound by military treaty, and who, at the very least, do not
fear invasion by other NATO members. In order to incentivize these
nations to establish such an organization, one might indicate that by
pooling their defensive forces, each would be allowed to dedicate less
domestic funding on military spending, because they could all rely on
each other in times of crisis.
If we are able to establish this core of countries in a supra-national
agency – which is a rather significant “if” – it would then likely be
very simple to rapidly expand the organization. For example, supposing
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that all NATO members joined such an agency, where protection was
guaranteed by the combined forces, military spending was lowered for
each member, and all members had a democratic say in the deployment
of forces and a guarantee that they would not be dominated, it would
become very attractive for small nations adjacent to member states to
join the union. This is because the small nations would suddenly find
themselves with a very large and powerful neighbor whom they had no
control over, but whom they could co-opt for their own protection by
simply joining the union. Once these small adjacent nations had joined,
the nations one step further out would then have a good incentive to
join, in order to enjoy the protection offered, and so on.13 Thus, even
though there is a significant and real difficulty in getting the core of such
a global state established, once this has been achieved, there would likely
be a rapid “snowball effect”, leading to all small nations clamoring to
join so as to ensure their safety in international relations.14 Therefore,
even if unlikely, it is possible to create such an entity.
The final objection concerns the organization of such a state, and is
rooted in the republican need to constrain individual dominium while
avoiding public imperium. The fear is that a global state, due to its
sheer size, might be prone toward either being incapable of any action,
because democracy on a global scale is simply too unwieldy, or it would
become a force of domination in its own right, because it would possess so
much power over the lives of its members, i.e. humanity. However, these
twin fears can be addressed using the time-tested republican prescription
for federation. If we recall the organization of the United States at the
time of its founding, we can see quite clearly how we might organize
a global state. The United States of America was established to be
precisely that; individual States of America that were United. The idea
was not to create a centralized government with large powers over the
widely separated peoples of the American continent, but rather to create
a federation of independent states, which would all gain by pooling some
of their efforts in a common cause for freedom. To be sure, the individual
states of the union did not ultimately retain the same level of autonomy
enjoyed at the time of foundation, but this need not cast doubt on the
model advocated. It is at least possible (if not plausible) that we can
establish an order of independent states which enjoy great autonomy in
their domestic legislation and governance, but which jointly contribute
to a small number of federal projects which facilitate the growth and
prosperity of the commonwealth of nations.
Taking this model and ideal seriously, we can simply add states to the
74 KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy, 2015, 29(1): 51–78
global sovereign order, and make no other demand than that they con-
tribute to those projects which are beneficial to all. These projects would
include the military infrastructure needed for international law and or-
der, some level of international judiciary to handle crimes of states or
leaders, and provisions for maintaining and improving trade. As long as
these are secured, the global sovereign can leave all domestic governance
to the domestic authorities, in the same way that a federal government
leaves state, county, or city legislation to those respective authorities.
By looking to the organization implemented in large federal republics,
we can see exactly how a global federal republic might be devised which
could ensure that no state dominates another, while itself not presenting
a force of domination.
It is also important to recall that what ensures that the state itself
not become a force of domination is just that the members of the state,
be they individuals in domestic society or member-states of the global
sovereign, be able to democratically contest the state’s decisions. The
reason republicanism demands a global sovereign is not because there
must always be some higher authority “keeping tabs” on the power of
institutions. If this were the case, then republicanism would lead to
an infinite regress. What republicanism demands is that the people
who could be interfered with by any power have some relevant say in
the exercise of that power. One of the age-old questions in republican
theory is “who watches the watchmen”. The answer is “those being
watched”. The state exists to protect our freedoms, and we ensure that
the state does not overreach its prerogative by contesting decisions we
find arbitrary. In the same vein, the global state exists to protect our
state’s sovereign freedoms, and it is our state’s responsibility, and ours,
to contest the decisions of the global state which we find to be arbitrary.
7 Conclusion
If we take the republican ideal of freedom as non-domination seriously,
it will never be enough to simply ensure domestic non-domination, but
will always require that states remain undominated as well. In the do-
mestic realm, non-domination could theoretically be achieved by either
the strategy of “reciprocal power”, where each individual is given the
means to defend him or herself, or by establishing some constitutional
provision to ensure non-domination. However, the strategy of “recipro-
cal power” will not be capable of securing international non-domination,
Nathan Wood: Republican International Relations 75
because implementation of the strategy would result in extensive and
long-lasting domination of whole peoples. This means that we should
instead seek to establish a minimal global sovereign with the power to
enforce each nation’s sovereign liberties and guarantee assistance in the
event of extreme need. This minimal global state would not go so far as
to be cosmopolitan, because it would not require that states help others,
so long as they did not dominate others. For this global state to avoid
becoming a force of imperium itself, it would be necessary to construct it
along federal lines, leaving a high level of autonomy to member nations.
It would also be necessary that the global state include an element of
contestatory democracy, allowing parties to effectively voice complaints
in an open and engaged forum, so as to ensure that when decisions go
against them, that is simply tough luck, and not an indicator of domi-
nation. The largest difficulty in establishing such an order would be in
convincing the first group of nations to relinquish control of their mil-
itaries to an international body, but once achieved, it is plausible that
the federation of nations would grow quickly, as smaller nations recog-
nized the benefits of collective protection. If something akin to this is
not achieved, it will not be possible to ensure non-domination between
states, and as a result, no agents will be truly free unless they have the
good fortune of living in a republican state which is able to defend itself
against any foe.
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Notes
1 The work of James Bohman is an exception to this statement. See [2, 1] for
his arguments connecting republican theory to intranationalism and cosmopoli-
tanism.
2 One might object that there is another possibility for securing non-domination,
for instance, through a suitably organized league of nations. An example of such
a proposal can be found in Kant’s Perpetual Peace. However, for reasons to be
explored in section 5, this response will not suffice for establishing freedom in the
republican sense.
76 KRITERION – Journal of Philosophy, 2015, 29(1): 51–78
3 The role of costs in republicanism is still a contested issue. See [10] for a concise
treatment of how costs factor into the republican ideal, and [21], Ch. 6 for a
critical analysis of the relation between costs and domination.
4 Other characterizations of “arbitrariness” presented in the literature include the
notions of ‘alien control’ [13], contestation [12, 11], or the Roman law treatment
of arbitrium as the distinguishing characteristic of the master-slave relationship
[19, 20], but all include the same basic arguments.
5 This is especially the case for so-called “dual use” weapons, which can be applied
to either defensive or offensive purposes. For an exposition of these kinds of
weapons, and cyber-security controls more generally, see [3].
6 Pettit makes a similar point in A political philosophy in public life, with respect
to the nations of Europe driving corporate tax rates down in an effort to attract
investment.
7 The reason for this is because the slave (like the well treated but weak state) has
his preferences met, but only because those in power are disposed to meet those
preferences. For republican freedom “it must be that [his] preference is satisfied
because it is [his] preference, and not for any other reason” [15, p. 4].
8 The classic definition of sovereignty is “supreme authority within a territory”,
[16], but this is inapplicable in the modern world, where virtually no single au-
thority ranges supreme in a given locale. For example, in any federal republic,
there will be certain ranges of affairs where the state (or province, territory, or
re´gion) is the supreme authority, and other ranges of affairs where the national
government is the supreme authority. A common example of such distributed
sovereignty in the modern world is the localized authority over education and the
national authority over defense. For an in-depth treatment of sovereignty, see [5].
9 I only consider objections to the argument that republicanism calls for a global
state, and do not address any general objections against the core theory of re-
publicanism.
10 [11], pp. 158–159. For the full argument against cosmopolitanism along these
lines, see [8].
11 This is a very minimal and rough characterization of cosmopolitanism. For a full
survey of the position, both as a moral and political principle, see [7].
12 This is in fact precisely how federal republics are usually organized. The national
government institutes some (minimal) uniform rule of law across all states or
provinces to prevent domination, but it does not forcibly redistribute the goods
of wealthier states to poorer ones. The national government is a guarantor of
basic necessities and fundamental rights, but not a provider of welfare.
13 There is a republican-minded worry that in the early stages of creating the global
state, domination might actually increase, because small nations not yet in the
union would have no say in the affairs of the much larger “global state” being
established adjacent. However, as long as there are no barriers to entering the
global state, this should only be a transitory problem.
14 It is not clear whether superpowers would be apt to join the global state, since
they would stand to lose the most, in terms of powers of interference. However,
it is plausible that once most other countries had already become members, the
benefits and protections to be had by joining might induce them to join as well.
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